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Executive Summary
The recent debate on Venezuela has primarily focused on the promotion of a political transition to
reestablish a functioning democracy, respect for human rights, and restore a viable economy.
However, the discussion and resulting actions should also focus on the need to address the medium
to long term regional effects of the Venezuelan migration crisis. The human dimensions of the
country’s protracted political, economic, and humanitarian crisis have been daunting, with 4.5
million Venezuelan migrants and refugees having fled their homeland between 2015 and 2019. This
massive exodus is having the greatest impact on Latin American and Caribbean countries. The
burden appears likely to intensify, moreover, as the number of displaced Venezuelans is projected
to reach 6.5 million Venezuelans by the end of 2020. This would represent the largest displaced
population the region has ever experienced and one of the most dire displacement crisis in the
world.1 Some sources estimate that the numbers could reach much higher levels. This
unprecedented demographic upheaval already poses serious challenges to one or more countries
in the region.
While recent analysis of these developments has focused on determining numbers and
profiles of Venezuelan migrants, and identifying short-term challenges, the objective of this study
is to assess the medium- to long-term effects of the migration crisis on regional stability. About
3.2 million, or 80 percent, of displaced Venezuelans, have settled in Latin American and Caribbean
countries. The remaining eight hundred thousand are scattered throughout the world, reversing
previous Venezuelan migration dynamics that took them to countries including the United States,
Italy, Portugal, and Spain, where familial links facilitated the migration process.2 This study
focuses on how the exodus will impact the economic, social, security, and political standing of
countries with the highest concentration of Venezuelan migrants—namely Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru.3
This paper seeks to provide an overview of the current status of the Venezuelan migration
crisis, while also mapping out challenges and opportunities for the region that result from this
exodus. The following key questions are addressed:
What are some of the protections available for Venezuelan migrants and the key characteristics of
the largest displacement of people the region has ever had?
What are the economic impacts – in terms of both costs and potential contributions – of Venezuelan
migrants and refugees in receiving countries?
What impact will their presence have on national and regional economic stability?
What measures have been implemented by receiving countries to protect migrants, and what
challenges have emerged?
What are the main security challenges faced by receiving countries, and how are they likely to be
exacerbated as the number of displaced Venezuelan migrants increases?

•
•
•
•
•

1

“Venezuelan Outflow Continues Unabated, Stands Now at 3.4 Million,” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and International
Organization for Migration, press release, February 22, 2019, https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2019/2/5c6fb2d04/venezuelan-outflow-continues-unabatedstands-34-million.html.
2
“Report of the OAS Working Group to Address the Regional Crisis Caused by Venezuela’s Migrant and Refugee Flows,” Organization of American
States, June 2019, http://www.oas.org/documents/eng/press/OAS-Report-to-Address-the- regional-crisis-caused-by-Venezuelas-migrant-lowres.pdf.
3

“Venezuelan Outflow Continues Unabated, Stands Now at 3.4 Million,” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and International
Organization for Migration, press release, February 22, 2019, https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2019/2/5c6fb2d04/venezuelan-outflow-continuesunabated-stands-34-million.html.
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•
•

What impact will the exodus have in national and regional politics?
Lastly, what impact will the migration crisis have on regional political stability?
Receiving countries need to prepare for likely mounting challenges to regional stability and
ensure that domestic policy responses will be adequate and enable them to make the most of this
migratory trend. Pressures are increasing as the collective socio-economic profile of fleeing
Venezuelans deteriorates. Earlier Venezuelan migration waves (e.g., in the early 2000s, and in
2014 after mass protests were violently repressed) included people with greater economic
resources and higher levels of educational attainment. They also included Venezuelans who could
facilitate their residence in other countries as a result of personal, business, or family ties. The
more recent wave of migrants consists primarily of more vulnerable populations. It has included
women traveling alone or with minors, unaccompanied minors, indigenous populations, a
struggling middle class, and the poor, who lack the necessary resources to facilitate their settlement
in host countries.4
The conditions affecting the displaced, and the determinants of the exodus, call into question
traditional definitions of a “migrant” or “refugee”, as well as the mandate of UN agencies and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) concerning the protection of this population. A recent
Organization of American States (OAS) report documents that the main determinants for the
forced displacement are: “the humanitarian crisis, reflected in the shortage of food and medicines;
the economic collapse, reflected in a hyperinflation of 10,000,000 percent; the systematic and
generalized violation of human rights, through persecution, repression, social control, and crimes
against humanity; the repeated failures in the supply of basic services, such as electricity, water,
and gas; and widespread violence, with a homicide rate of 81 people per 100,000 inhabitants.”5
The distinction between “migrants” and “refugees” is relevant in terms of the protections
receiving countries are expected to extend, and the responses the international community can
provide. International law distinguishes between the categories. It usually applies the term
“migrant” to those who move voluntarily, and the term “refugee” to those who are involuntarily
displaced, usually as a result of persecution. Building on the 1951 Refugee Convention, 6 within
the Inter-American system, the 1984 Cartagena Declaration expands the definition of a refugee to
include “...people who have fled their country because their lives, security or freedom have been
threatened by widespread violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of
human rights or other circumstances that have seriously disturbed the public order.” Considering
the precarious situation in Venezuela that compels people to flee, this framework could help protect
this wave of migrants.
Until now, countries in the Western Hemisphere have not used the Cartagena Declaration to
guarantee protection for Venezuelans. While they generally have responded with generosity,
pragmatism, and creativity to the exodus of Venezuelan migrants, the rapid growth in the number
of arrivals—and the corresponding strain placed on host-country communities—increasingly
impact regularization processes. Earlier responses included offering temporary residence, as well

4

Betilde Muñoz-Pogossian, “Heading Out: A Tale of Three Migration Waves,” Caracas Chronicles, December 6, 2018,
https://www.caracaschronicles.com/2018/12/06/heading-out-a-tale-of-three-migration-waves/.
5
“Report of the OAS Working Group to Address the Regional Crisis Caused by Venezuela’s Migrant and Refugee Flows.”
6
The 1951 Refugee Convention defines a refugee “as a person who is outside his or her country of nationality or habitual residence; has a well-founded
fear of being persecuted because of his or her race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; and is unable or
unwilling to avail him— or herself of the protection of that country, or to return there, for fear of persecution (Article 1A(2)).
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as temporary protected status, with certain flexibility of entry requirements (use of cédulas de
identidad or identification documentation, acceptance of expired passports, waiver of apostille in
certain documents, etc.). However, as the number of arriving migrants continues to rise, the
responses are becoming increasingly restrictive. These restrictions include the implementation of
new visa requirements, forcing migrants to obtain a visa in Venezuela, or at specific consulates
throughout the region, before reaching a port-of-entry in their destination countries. These
measures have the potential unintended effect of promoting unsafe, disorderly, and irregular
migration as Venezuelans continue to flee with or without regular status. As documented by a 2019
OAS-Migration Policy Institute report, approximately 60 percent of Venezuelans who have fled
the country since 2015 are in irregular status.7 Restricting conditions for a safe, regular, and orderly
arrival will inevitably generate more irregular migration. It will also render this population more
vulnerable, negatively impacting economic, security, and social conditions in the receiving
countries.8
The following section evaluates the weight of the Venezuelan exodus on the economies of
receiving countries. It also assesses the opportunities arising from the inclusion of migrants and
refugees in the formal labor markets of receiving economies. The third section provides a review
of current gaps in the protection of this population. The fourth section covers the principal security
challenges associated with the migration crisis. The fifth section looks at the potential impact of a
growing Venezuelan diaspora on political dynamics in receiving countries, and in Venezuela itself.
The final section summarizes the main conclusions and policy recommendations to respond to the
medium- to long-term challenges resulting from the crisis.

The Economic Challenges and Opportunities of the Venezuelan Migrant and
Refugee Community
In the context of the largest migration crisis in the Western Hemisphere's history, countries across
the region demonstrated great generosity and compassion for the more than four million
Venezuelans who have fled their country. Given the prolonged nature of the crisis—and
projections that point to a total of more than 6.5 million migrants expected to have fled Venezuela
by the end of 2020— countries across the region should focus on integrating existing migrants and
new arrivals into the formal labor force. While many Venezuelans can be expected to return once the
crisis ends, some undoubtedly will remain in receiving countries. This reality presents both short- and long-term challenges and opportunities for host countries as they take steps to help migrants
become productive members of society.
Migration flows affect receiving countries’ economies in several ways, including impacts
on labor markets and social-security systems, price adjustments, economic growth, and fiscal
balance. The flow of more than four million Venezuelan migrants undoubtedly places an economic
7

Andrew Seele, Jessica Bolter, Betilde Muñoz-Pogossian, and Miryam Hazan, “Creativity Amid Crisis: Legal Pathways for Venezuelan Migrants in
Latin America,” Migration Policy Institute, January 2019, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/legal-pathways-venezuelan-migrants-latin-america.
8

Some migrants are obliged to employ dangerous forms of transport or to travel in hazardous conditions, even use smugglers and other types of
facilitators, and being exposed to situations of exploitation or abuse. At the same time, this frequently results in crimes associated with the migration
process, which tie to criminal networks and transnational crime and generate new security challenges for transit or destination countries. For more,
see "Principles and Guidelines, Supported by Practical Guidance, on the Human Rights Protections of Migrants in Vulnerable Situations," Office of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and Global Migration Group,
https//www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Migration/PrinciplesAndGuidelines.pdf.
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strain on receiving and transit countries as they seek to address the migrants’ immediate
humanitarian needs. With respect to labor markets, according to the June 2019 Monetary Policy
Report by the Chilean Central Bank, the impact of Venezuelan migration on the workforce of the
leading destination countries was already being felt, with Venezuelan migrants representing 0.5
percent and 4.4 percent of the total workforce in Argentina and Colombia respectively.9
The report also quotes the “2018 Central Reserve Bank of Peru Annual Review,” which
notes that Venezuelan migration “would have reduced salary costs, and potentially the prices of
activities in the services sector.” One significant effect of Venezuelan arrivals that receiving
countries need to address is the increase in labor supply. The availability of cheaper labor can
lower costs for employers and raise profit margins, which could help lower costs for products and
services in the receiving country and generate increases in consumer spending. However, it may
also result, in the politically unpalatable displacement of the local population from jobs.
Increased demand for jobs has two additional unintended effects in the short-term. On the
one hand, it impacts employment levels, quality of job opportunities, and salaries. On the other,
tensions emerge between the local population and the new arrivals as they compete for already
scarce resources. Thus, the ability of host countries to integrate Venezuelan migrants and refugees
into formal labor markets is crucial for the successful management of the migration crisis at the
local and national level. It is also critical that receiving countries seek to capitalize on the economic
potential of these migrants, leading to net economic gains.
The fiscal impact of the migration crisis is being felt most acutely in Colombia and Peru,
where the influx of Venezuelan migrants has been the largest. A 2019 IMF report on Colombia
projects that, by the end of 2019, fiscal costs associated with flows from Venezuela will be around
0.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), and are contributing to Colombia’s fiscal
challenges.10 The report notes that a commitment to provide humanitarian support such as health
care, housing, and education to migrants will result in additional near-term net fiscal costs for
Colombia, which are expected to peak in 2020 as migrants integrate into the economy. The report
also states that these costs will gradually decline to 0.1 percent of GDP by 2024, as migrants
integrate into the economy, and associated growth increases.
The role played by local governments in absorbing the flows of migrants and refugees needs
to be better understood. Indeed, subnational governments (departments and municipalities) bear
most of these costs, as they typically provide most of the goods and services required to meet the
immediate needs of migrants. In Colombia, a recent report points to how the differences in the
distribution of the migrant population, both in size and in characteristics and abilities, generate
variations in the costs that local government must assume.11

9

“Informe de Política Monetaria,” Chilean Central Bank, June 2019, file:///C:/Users/bvmr/Downloads/ipm062019%20(1).pdf.
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According to the Colombian Ministry of Finance, the short-term fiscal costs of the Venezuelan migration in Colombia range between 0.4–0.6
percent of GDP, whereas the Colombian Fedesarrollo and the World Bank put the number at 0.2–0.4 percent and 0.3–0.4 percent, respectively.
“Nota de la OCDE Sobre el Shock Migratorio desde Venezuela hacia Colombia y sus Implicaciones fiscales,” Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development, 2019, 4, https://www.oecd.org/economy/surveys/Colombia-migration-shock-note-spanish-2019.pdf.
11

Reina, Mauricio, Carlos Antonio Mesa & Tomás Ramírez Tobón, “Elementos para una política pública frente a la crisis de Venezuela,”
Cuadernos Fedesarrollo 69, Noviembre 2018, p. 98,
https://www.repository.fedesarrollo.org.co/bitstream/handle/11445/3716/CDF_No_69_Noviembre_2018.pdf?sequence= 1&isAllowed=y.
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Figure 1: Estimates of Net Fiscal Cost from Migrants from Venezuela (Percent of GDP)12

Source: Colombia: IMF Country Report No. 19/106. International Monetary staff estimates.
In June 2019, Chile’s Central Bank released a higher than expected estimate for national economic
growth in the medium term. The report notes that rapid immigration–mainly from Venezuela–
boosted potential output while easing upward pressure on wages and prices, enabling the most
significant interest-rate cut in a decade.13 Benefits would vary depending on the degree to which
Chile can integrate migrants into the formal labor market. In the case of Peru, its central bank
stated that immigration might have lowered inflation, as Venezuelans pushed down wages while
consumption by Venezuelan migrants accounted for 0.33 percent of the total 4 percent of GDP
growth in 2018.14 That figure will likely be closer to 1 percent based on the rapid growth in the
number of Venezuelan migrants throughout 2018 and in the first half of 2019. However, their
positive impact on the Peruvian economy is limited, given that an estimated seven of ten
Venezuelan migrants work in the informal economy. While half of the country’s Venezuelan
migrants have work permits, only some 5 percent were officially employed as of April 2019.15
A large number of Venezuelan migrants and refugees have arrived with depleted livelihoods,
no assets, and minimal access to funding. However, a significant number of them also have an
education or profession, better equipping them to contribute to their receiving countries. An April
2019 International Organization for Migration (IOM) survey of Venezuelan nationals in South
America shows that 57 percent and 46 percent of respondents in Argentina and Chile, respectively,
had completed a university degree. On average, 26 percent of Venezuelan respondents in
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay had finished a degree. In Brazil, only 4 percent of those
12

“Colombia: IMF Country Report No. 19/106,” International Monetary Fund, April 2019,
https://www.imf.org/~/media/Files/Publications/CR/2019/1COLEA2019001.ashx
13
Daniela Guzman and John Quigley, “Add a Million Venezuelans and Your Economy Looks Very Different,” Bloomberg, June 27, 2019,
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-27/add-a-million-venezuelans-and-your-economy- looks-very-different.
14
"Inmigración venezolana: Los beneficios y problemas que trae a la economía de Perú," BBC News Mundo, June 2, 2019,
https://elcomercio.pe/economia/peru/inmigracion-venezolana-beneficios-problemas-trae-economia-peru-venezuela- noticia-640070.
15
Guzman and Quigley, “Add a Million Venezuelans and Your Economy Looks Very Different.”
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interviewed indicated that they had not completed any education. In other words, the majority had
attained a certain level of education.16
Venezuelan migrants in Colombia conform to the same pattern. According to a recent report by the
Brookings Institution, the Venezuelan migrant population there is predominately young,
moderately educated, and ready to join the labor force. The study asserts that, of the million-plus
Venezuelan migrants in Colombia, more than 75 percent are working age, and 83 percent have
completed at least secondary education.17 These Venezuelans can potentially be a productive
cohort, contributing to economic and productivity growth.
Colombia is working to identify and resolve legal restrictions that limit the integration of
the Venezuelan migrants into the formal labor force. Some of these measures include moving to
recognize migrants’ work history and educational experience, as well as expanding access to
programs that aim to promote entrepreneurship and provide technical, networking, and financial
support, as well as training.
The response across the region is varied. While some countries are still deciding on
mechanisms to integrate these populations, others have taken important steps to minimize barriers
to access economic opportunities and to tap into the human capital of migrants. The sooner countries
regularize migrants’ legal status and grant work permits, the sooner migrants and refugees can
contribute economically to both their host countries and their native Venezuela. Although a large
influx of migrants and refugees can create short-term strains on public services, labor-market
adjustments, social tensions, and other challenges, it can also provide positive contributions to
host-country economies.
As the number of migrants increases, one area of growing concern is that the flow of
migrants will exceed the ability of receiving countries to regularize new arrivals and integrate them
into the formal labor force. This could result in large numbers of people operating in the shadows
as part of the informal economy. Similarly, it may place migrants in vulnerable situations as they
can be victims of employer abuse, forced labor, and discrimination, among other scourges.
Venezuelan women face additional vulnerabilities, such as lack of access to fair and equal salaries,
as well as gender discrimination and violence.

16

“South America — Analysis of Flows Monitoring Surveys Conducted with Venezuelan Nationals In South America,” International Organization for
Migration, May 22, 2019, https://migration.iom.int/reports/south-america-%E2%80%94- analysis-flow-monitoring-surveys-conducted-venuzuelannationals-south-0.
17

Dany Bahar, Dany, Meagan Dooley, and Cindy Huang, “Integrating Venezuelans into the Colombian Labor Market: Mitigating Costs and
Maximizing Benefits,” Brookings, December 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/wp- content/uploads/2018/12/Venezuelan-Migrants_English.pdf.
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Box 1: Benefits of Labor Inclusion of Migrants
A study of refugees around the world by the Center for Global Development notes that the
benefits of labor inclusion for host communities include:
• less competition in the informal sector, as some refugees shift to formal work,
potentially leading to employment opportunities for low-skilled hosts in the informal
sector;
• more productive formal businesses, as refugees, could fill labor shortages and expand
the labor supply;
• more formal employment opportunities resulting from the increase in productivity;
• the upgrading of local workers to higher-paying positions, as migrants and refugees
take on more manual jobs;
• a fiscal stimulus, as refugees, earn more and spend more; and
• an increase in tax revenues, as refugees earn and spend more, and contribute to the tax
base as they integrate into the formal economy.14
•
Venezuelan migrants and refugees likewise contribute to their home country through remittances,
consistent with trends among diaspora populations globally. According to the World Bank, in Latin
America, remittances flows increased by about 9.3 percent from 2017 to 2018 to reach $87 billion
overall, while independent experts estimate that displaced Venezuelans have been remitting about
$2 billion annually.18 Comparatively speaking, remittances to Venezuela lag well behind amounts
sent to Mexico, Guatemala or El Salvador. This can be attributable to the precarious conditions
Venezuelan migrants and refugees face. However, remittance levels will likely increase over time,
as Venezuelan migrants integrate into receiving countries. Monitoring the flow of remittances will
be crucial in planning medium- to long-term economic outcomes for Venezuela. As the number of
Venezuelans living outside of the country grows, one area of concern that requires further analysis
is how the inflow of these remittances can help sustain Nicolás Maduro’s regime.
Migrants and refugees can also contribute to Venezuela’s reconstruction through their
human capital, as well as by leveraging diaspora networks and the know-how gained through the
migration experience.19 Social remittances, or the sharing of "ideas, behaviors, identities, and
social capital that flow from receiving to countries of origin,” are another positive way a diaspora
can contribute.20 Venezuelans who settle in their new countries have the potential to bring good
ideas and behaviors to be brought to Venezuela in the form of policy reforms, projects, and
proposals, and a re-institutionalized civic culture.

18

“Accelerated Remittances Growth to Low- and Middle-Income Countries in 2018,” World Bank, press release, December 8, 2018,
https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2018/12/08/accelerated-remittances-growth-to-low-and- middle-income-countries-in-2018; “Fact
Sheet: Family Remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean in 2018,” Inter- American Dialogue, February 8, 2019,
https://www.thedialogue.org/analysis/fact-sheet-family-remittances-to-latin- america-and-the-caribbean-in-2018/.
19

Ricardo Hausmann, “The Diaspora Goldmine,” Project Syndicate, June 25, 2015, https://www.project- syndicate.org/commentary/remittances-notonly-benefit-to-homeland-economies-by-ricardo-hausmann-2015- 06?barrier=accesspaylog.
20
Peggy Levitt, “Social Remittances: Migration-Driven Local-Level Forms of Cultural Diffusion,” International Migration Review 32, 4 (1998), 926–
948.

10

Protection of Venezuelan Migrants and Refugees: Responses and Gaps
Migration policy is always designed and implemented within a nation’s sovereignty, and it usually
responds to the tension between the needs to ensure a country’s national security and to guarantee
the human rights of migrants and refugees. In this framework, each nation has the right to find the
appropriate balance for its own context, but not without assuming the global responsibility to
protect those whose rights are not fully guaranteed in their country of origin. Indeed, when making
decisions about what rights and support to afford them, countries should bear in mind the
conditions displaced Venezuelans faced, as some of the responses can add layers of vulnerability
to this already affected population.
Migration Policy Responses: Migrants’ Legal Status
Each country of destination for Venezuelans has its way of processing their legal status, based on
the options available in its migration regime.21 Colombia set a commendable example, offering a
temporary protected status (the PEP, or Permiso Especial de Permanencia) and other measures
aimed at regularizing this population. Ecuador used to allow Venezuelans to enter the country with
an investment or a Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) credential. Peru adopted the
Permiso Temporal de Permanencia, or PTP, to regularize Venezuelans. Recently, however, these
countries changed these protection regimes as well as the conditions for entry.22 Following the
example of Chile—where Venezuelans are required to acquire the Visa de Responsabilidad
Democrática (Democratic Responsibility Visa) in two consulates in Venezuela, rather than upon
arrival—Ecuador and Peru recently opted for a similar visa, the Visa Humanitaria (Humanitarian
Visa).23
Indeed, as required by a recent presidential decree in Ecuador, Venezuelans have been
required to request a Humanitarian Visa for temporary residency since August, 2019.24 The
measure also orders the implementation of a voluntary administrative census of Venezuelan
migrants, as part of a broader effort to regularize them, better integrate them into the formal
economy, and expand their access to basic services.25 The evolution of options for the
regularization of Venezuelans shows a learning process, as both the Humanitarian Visa and the
administrative census were already implemented by Chile and Colombia, respectively. Innovations
brought about by the Ecuadorean measure include: the formal recognition of expired Venezuelan
passports and cédulas de identidad (identity cards) for five years after expiration, provided the
holder was in Ecuador before the approval of the measure; and, amnesty for all Venezuelans in an
irregular situation, provided they did not enter via illegal pathways, but via formal ports-of-entry
in Ecuador. Also, the decree stipulates that Venezuelan migrants will have access to employment
21

For a summary of legal responses by countries in the Americas, see Selee et al., “Creativity Amid Crisis: Legal Pathways for Venezuelan
Migrants in Latin America,” https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/legal-pathways-venezuelan- migrants-latin-america.
22
Back in 2008, the Ecuadorian government eliminated visa requirements to enter the country for transit and tourism. Venezuelans had one hundred
and eighty days to apply for visas under the 2017 Organic Law of Human Mobility. There are two specific visa categories that Venezuelan nationals can
request: the 2011 Ecuadorian-Venezuelan Migration Statute, which grants temporary residence if economic solvency is demonstrated; and the
UNASUR visa, through which nationals of the block can have access to temporary or permanent residence. However, this last visa will be rescinded,
given President Lenin Moreno’s denouncement of the UNASUR charter.
23
Already in effect in the case of Peru, this visa is currently being analyzed in Ecuador.
24

Juan Fernando Flores (@juanflores18), Tweet, July 26, 2019, https://twitter.com/juanflores18/status/1154836219483820035/photo/1. This visa
would be available to Venezuelans wishing to enter the country in the future and those already in Ecuador who have not broken the law.
25
For more information, see “Ecuador to Require Visas for Venezuelan Migrants: Moreno,” Reuters, July 26, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/usecuador-venezuela-migration/ecuador-to-require-visas-for-venezuelan-migrants- moreno-idUSKCN1UL29T?utm_source=applenews.
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opportunities, health care, and education.26
Figure 2. Regularization Options for Venezuelans in Main Receiving Countries (as of July 2019)
Regularization Options

Acceptance of Expired
Passports /Cédulas de
Identidad
Yes

Colombia

Permiso Especial de Permanencia (PEP);
RAMV- PEP, Tarjeta de Movilidad
Fronteriza; Permiso Especial de Tránsito

Peru

Humanitarian Visa (to be implemented)

Yes

Ecuador

Yes

Chile

Humanitarian Visa (starting August 25,
2019)
Temporary Residency Permit and
MERCOSUR Agreement
Humanitarian Visa

Brazil

Temporary Residency Permit

Argentina

Yes
Yes (Starting in 2013, and only
for two years starting April 28,
2019)
No passport
required

Source: Prepared by the authors for this report.
Brazil and Argentina have less restrictive regimes for Venezuelans (and all migrants and refugees),
allowing them temporary residency using the current migration regime and the MERCOSUR
agreement as the frameworks for protection, respectively, and accepting cédulas de identidad as
well as expired passports as valid forms of identification.
In the case of the United States, Republicans and Democrats in the United States Congress
have proposed granting Venezuelans Temporary Protected Status (TPS) as a temporary protection
measure. TPS grants legal stay to foreign nationals who are unable to return to their home
countries due to an ongoing armed conflict, environmental disaster or epidemic, or other
extraordinary and temporary conditions.27 It has been granted to protect Salvadorans following two
major earthquakes in 2001, as well as to Honduran and Nicaraguan, victims of Hurricane Mitch,
and to Haitians displaced in 2010 after an earthquake. Although no natural disaster or ongoing armed
conflict has affected Venezuela, the approval of TPS for Venezuelan nationals merits consideration
given the protracted economic, humanitarian, and political calamity in their country. The depth and
scale of the crisis has created extraordinary and temporary conditions that prevent Venezuelans
from safely returning home, a critical factor in making the case for TPS designation.
In December 2018, Senator Robert Menendez (D-NJ), ranking member of the Senate

26

Ecuadorian Presidential Decree, https://www.registroficial.gob.ec/index.php/registro-oficial- web/publicaciones/suplementos/item/11878-segundosuplemento-registro-oficial-no-5.
27

Claire Felter and Amanda Shendruk, “What is Temporary Protected Status?” Council of Foreign Relations, May 8, 2018,
https://www.cfr.org/article/what-temporary-protected-status; “Temporary Protected Status,” US Citizenship and Immigration Services,
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/temporary-protected-status.
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Foreign Relations Committee, joined by senators Marco Rubio (R-FL), Dick Durbin (D-IL), and
Patrick Leahy (D-VT), introduced the Venezuela Temporary Protected Status and Asylum
Assistance Act of 2018. This bipartisan legislation seeks to grant TPS for eligible Venezuelans
and to provide support and technical assistance to help neighboring countries provide migration
services and asylum.28 The bill has yet to receive a vote in the Senate.
There is also significant support for TPS in the House of Representatives. On July 25, the
House passed the Venezuela TPS Act of 2019 by simple majority with a vote of 272 –158.29
However, Senate Republicans blocked a vote on the bill. Senator Mike Lee (R-UT) opposed a
request to pass the House bill by unanimous consent, stating that fast-tracking it would not give
Republicans enough time to consider it and make changes.30 Furthermore, in March 2019, Senators
Durbin and Rubio penned a bipartisan letter asking President Donald Trump to consider
designating Venezuela for TPS.31 Twenty-four other members of Congress signed the letter, but
the matter remains unresolved, reflecting the difficulties in balancing foreign policy interests with
immigration policies in the United States.
Regularization Challenges
One of the most difficult challenges faced by receiving countries throughout the region is the
regularization of Venezuelans' legal status; in particular, addressing their limited access to forms
of identification and compliance with entry requirements. Venezuelans confront significant
difficulties accessing personal-identification documents, especially passports. The official cost of
a passport is set at $120. A report by Bloomberg News indicated that, in October 2018, the going
rate for a black-market passport was more than $2,000, more than sixty-eight times the monthly
minimum wage at the time.32 Apart from the cost, passport offices in Venezuela and in Venezuelan
consulates have temporarily ceased providing services due to a lack of materials and the continued
disruptions the country is experiencing. This is a growing problem, as more and more Venezuelans
living outside the country either have, or will soon have, expired passports. Coupled with tightening
passport requirements by several countries in the region, difficulties in renewing Venezuelan
passports are further limiting migrants' mobility.
One concrete effect of this limited access to IDs is irregular migration. Venezuelans who
travel to Colombia, and other countries in South America do so in an irregular manner (by trochas,
or illegal passageways, sometimes, with help from coyotes), and sometimes on foot (caminantes
venezolanos) to avoid official ports of entry where passports or visas are required. This type of
irregular migration puts individuals at greater risk in both transit and destination countries.
This pattern also feeds criminal networks that traffic migrants and promotes corruption by
officials who are bribed to allow the illegal entrance of migrants. In this regard, Colombia’s
28
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decision in 2018 to regularize Venezuelan nationals, with or without a passport, reflected the
recognition of Venezuelans limited access to passports. Other countries in the region could do the
same, since Venezuelans will migrate with or without a passport, and irregular status adds to their
vulnerability and the cost of integrating them.
Stateless Venezuelan infants, born of Venezuelan parents in Colombian territory, pose
additional challenges related to migrants’ access to identification. Although more than twenty-four
thousand children were at risk of being stateless, on August 5, 2019 the Colombian government
moved to grant them provisional Colombian citizenship. Children who were born in Colombia of
Venezuelan parents since 2015 will be able to enjoy full Colombian citizenship, as will children
born two years after the measure was put in place. This represents a clear rejection of xenophobia
and shows the Colombian government’s commitment to the protection of human rights over other
considerations, including fiscal costs. More permanent measures to grant citizenship to these
children will be needed if the Venezuelan crisis persists.
Venezuelans’ right to identity documentation is also related to their right to freedom of
movement across countries. Some Venezuelans obtained passports that are still valid before fleeing
their home country. However, as time passes, migrants whose passports expired, or are soon to
expire, and who do not have a second nationality, face additional challenges. Interim Venezuelan
President Juan Guaidó recently approved a decree guaranteeing diaspora Venezuelans the right to
identity.33 As a result, the validity of Venezuelan passports has been extended for five years, and
this extension has thus far been recognized by the governments of the United States, Spain, Canada,
Colombia, Argentina, and a few others. Still, no systematic evidence demonstrates whether these
updated passports are being honored at ports of entry in the countries that have recognized the
extension. A recent Twitter survey focused on whether Venezuelans migrants with expired
passports can move freely found that 63 percent of the 8,364 participants preferred not to travel for
fear of being stranded or being unable to return to the United States.34
However, there is still a need to find alternative ways to guarantee this fundamental right –
the freedom of movement. Currently, Venezuelans with expired passports cannot demonstrate their
identity by presenting a valid document, and thus are unable to visit countries that have not
accepted Guaido’s passport extension. This creates an additional vulnerability for affected
Venezuelan migrants and refugees.35
Across the region, countries grapple with ways to ensure access to economic opportunities
for Venezuelan migrants while managing the influx of skilled and unskilled workers into their
labor markets. Some countries have imposed restrictions on the number of foreign workers
companies can hire. In Peru, for instance, according to the Peruvian Economic Institute, about 43
percent of Peruvian companies struggle to fill job vacancies because, by law, no more than 20 percent
of a company payroll can be foreign workers.36
Although regularization regimes allow migrants to access work permits, in practice, there are
33
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two types of challenges. On the one hand, the 40 percent or so of Venezuelan migrants and refugees
who are regularized face difficulties in having prompt access to the necessary documents, due to
the high volume of requests and the limited capacity of countries to process them. Similarly,
migrants face employers who, as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
notes, do not accept these work permits.37 On the other hand, the remaining 60 percent or so who
have an irregular status do not have access to work permits, creating a situation of labor informality
and overdependence on government support or charity. The measure adopted by Colombia in
August 2018—which granted temporary protected status with a work permit for Venezuelans—
and the most recent measure approved by Ecuador—granting amnesty and a work permit for
irregular Venezuelans who entered via formal ports of entry—are effective ways to guarantee
social protection. Likewise, if overcrowding or capacity limitations mean receiving countries
cannot ensure that those arriving with children can enroll them in school, a whole generation of
Venezuelan migrants could be left behind.
Figure 4. Access to Work Permits in Main Receiving Countries, as of July 2019.
Work Permit provided
Colombia
Peru

Yes, for PEP, RAMV-PEP holders
Yes, for PTP holders and asylum-seekers

Ecuador

Yes, for UNASUR, and Humanitarian visa holders

Argentina

Yes, for MERCOSUR-Agreement beneficiaries

Chile

Yes, for Humanitarian visa holders

Brazil

Yes, for temporary residents, permanent residents and asylum seekers

Source: Prepared by the authors for this report.
To address these challenges, receiving countries could adopt more flexible requirements regarding
passports and other forms of ID; they might even consider generating a regional form of
identification for Venezuelans. Concerning regularization, adopting a regional temporary
protected status for Venezuelans would be a move away from more restrictive policies, but that
would require financial, technical, and political support to receiving countries. Such a coordinated
response would ensure that countries across the region share the responsibility and that the
displaced population does not end up being absorbed by those countries that opt to put in place more
generous policies. Another option would be to apply the Cartagena Declaration to protect
Venezuelans. Although readily available as a form of protection, the declaration would offer this
population a wider framework for protection and would enable Venezuelans already displaced to
have the same rights as nationals of the receiving country to health services, housing, employment,
and other social protections. This demand for social services would represent additional economic
pressures on these countries.
37
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The final important point is to reconcile the apparent contradiction between the policies of those
countries favoring a democratic transition in Venezuela and their responses to the inflows of
migrants and refugees across their borders. The lack of approval in the United States of a temporary
protected measure, and the progressively more restrictive migration policies in countries in the
region, illustrate the policy contradictions with which these countries are grappling. While Lima
Group countries and the United States publicly support interim President Guaidó and the quest for
a return to democracy in Venezuela, they are slowly adopting more restrictive migratory policies.
Some countries have begun considering deporting those who violate immigration standards,
namely due to a lack of a valid visa or other documentation. As restrictive migration policies spread
in Latin America, the burden on countries that continue to lower the barriers to entry for
Venezuelan migrants will increase. These policies will likely also lead more migrants into the
shadows, increasing their vulnerability to exploitation and susceptibility to being recruited by
illegal groups into illicit and destabilizing activities.
The tensions between support for a democratic transition, and the domestic political and
fiscal realities faced by host governments will continue to grow until the political crisis in Venezuela
is resolved. Likewise, as the burden on countries in the region rises in terms of economic costs,
social tensions, and security challenges, domestic pressure against the growing presence of
migrants is likely to intensify. Such pressures will likely be felt most acutely in the lead-up to subnational and presidential campaigns in the region, as the issue of migrants is increasingly
politicized and used as a wedge issue.

Security Challenges: Gaps in the Policy Discussion and Responses
The scale of the Venezuelan migration crisis presents diverse security challenges. They are
primarily related to transnational criminal activities associated with migration processes, including
human smuggling and trafficking; recruitment of young Venezuelans for illicit activities; and
exploitation of migrants for sexual and labor purposes, as migrants who lack legal status retreat
into the shadows. In addition, as the scale of the migration crisis continues to strain health and other
basic services in receiving countries, the risk of a pandemic or the spread of communicable
diseases is growing. Likewise, the longer the Venezuelan crisis and resulting exodus continues, and
the more humanitarian conditions deteriorate, there is a risk that Venezuela will experience a
famine that could lead to a dramatic increase in the number of migrants fleeing the country. That,
of course, would further strain the ability of receiving countries to care for and to integrate new
migrants. The pain would be felt most acutely in Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, and Brazil.
Transnational Criminal Activities
As noted earlier, as more Venezuelan migrants go into the shadows, lacking access to basic services
and economic opportunities, many will face growing pressures to engage in illegal activities to make
ends meet. The most vulnerable are the most susceptible to being recruited by narcotraffickers and
other criminal elements. Migrants have been recruited by illegal armed groups operating along the
border between Colombia and Venezuelan, including the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) the
Ejército Popular de Liberación (EPL), and dissident groups of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias
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de Colombia (FARC).38 Venezuelans have joined illegal armed groups–forcibly or voluntarily–as
combatants, informants, and hitmen or women. Many also participate in illicit activities that help
finance the operations of armed groups, such as drug production, as well as the smuggling of gasoline
(used to produce cocaine from coca leaves), narcotics, and people.39
Over the long term, as the number of undocumented Venezuelan migrants grows, so do
questions regarding their treatment by emergency and health care services. Crimes committed
against them, including domestic violence and other forms of abuse, are also less likely to be
reported, and mistrust of the police likely to rise. One significant challenge, which will test the
capacity of countries to ensure domestic security, concerns transnational crimes associated with
the migration crisis—principally affecting migrant women and children (e.g., human smuggling
and trafficking in persons).
According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), in 2014 (the last year for
which data are available), women and children were the most frequent victims of human
smuggling—representing approximately 71 percent. The proportion of boys and girls who are
victims of this scourge has increased, from 13 percent in 2004 to 28 percent in 2014. Girls
generally make up the majority of children who are victims of human smuggling. This crime,
transnational in nature, makes women and girls the primary victims of sexual exploitation, forced
labor, and other forms of modern slavery, forced marriages, organ extraction, pornography, illegal
adoptions, and other crimes. A recent study by the Centro de Justicia y Paz (CEPAZ) in Venezuela
argues that more attention needs to be paid to these crimes against women and girls and that the
double and triple vulnerabilities Venezuelan women face in the process of migration must be better
appreciated.40
Similarly, evidence suggests that armed groups in Colombia and Venezuela prey on the
hunger and desperation of Venezuelan migrants. According to National Public Radio (NPR) and
Insight Crime, those recruited by armed groups receive up to 50,000 Venezuelan bolívares per
month, the equivalent of approximately $300 at the July 2019 exchange rate.41 At the time, that
was the equivalent of more than twenty-seven monthly minimum wages in Venezuela (one
month’s minimum salary was approximately $12 in July 2019).42 Faced with a choice between
hunger or joining the ranks of organized crime groups, vulnerable Venezuelans are choosing to
participate in illicit activities, thereby strengthening criminal organizations while contributing to
the spread of criminal activities in the region.
Epidemics, Pandemics, Communicable Diseases, and Strained Health Care Systems
There is also a growing health risk to the region as a result of the ongoing Venezuelan migration
crisis. The ongoing political, social, economic, and humanitarian crisis in Venezuela has caused a
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significant decline in the country’s social and health indicators.43 While retaining some capacity,
Venezuela’s health system is currently acutely stressed by shortages of medicines and health care
supplies, as well as the migration of many health care workers. In addition, frequent disruptions of
public services (electricity, water, communications, and transportation) hinder access to essential
health services and limit the ability to respond to emergencies and disease outbreaks.
This deterioration in Venezuela is evident in the reemergence of previously controlled and
eradicated diseases, including measles and diphtheria.44 A measles outbreak that started in July
2017, with cases reported in all twenty-three states and the capital district in Venezuela, has been
progressively controlled. Since 2018, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Canada, Chile, Ecuador, Peru,
and the United States have also reported cases in which the measles genotype associated with the
outbreak in Venezuela was identified.45 Other public-health concerns in Venezuela include an
increase in tuberculosis cases, as well as maternal and infant mortality, mental health, and violence
prevention. A further concern is the limited access to medicines, adequate nutrition, and adequate
care for people with life-threatening acute and chronic conditions, including people living with
HIV and hemophilia.
Several efforts are underway to provide support in neighboring countries (Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, and Trinidad and Tobago) to respond to the growing regional
health risk caused by the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela and the resulting flow of migrants.
Activities are aimed at strengthening health system responses in border areas, vaccination, and
epidemiological surveillance at the local and national levels to detect and respond effectively to the
needs of migrants and host populations.46
Hunger and Malnutrition
Until recently, the Latin America and Caribbean region was a global leader in the fight against
hunger and malnutrition, according to the United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO). It was the first region in the world to commit to eradicating hunger by 2025, and by 2015,
had already cut hunger rates in half. However, hunger is now on the rise, and in 2018 affected 42.5
million people in the region (6.5 percent of the population), according to a UN report issued in
2019.47 The increase in South America is primarily driven by the deterioration of food security
in Venezuela, where malnutrition rates rose from 6.4 percent in 2012–2014 to 21.2 percent in
2016–2018.48 A survey of Venezuelans’ quality of life, conducted in 2018 by three Venezuelan
universities found that 80 percent of homes were food insecure and more than 61 percent of
respondents went to sleep hungry.49
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The non-governmental organization Caritas reports particularly high levels of malnutrition among
children and pregnant women.50 This situation is more worrisome for younger children. November
2018 estimates by Cáritas suggest that up to 22.9 percent of all children under five years-old in
Venezuela may be mildly or severely malnourished.”51 The Venezuelan Health Observatory
(Observatorio Venezolano de la Salud, OVS) has reported that approximately 60 percent of
children are malnourished. According to information provided to Human Rights Watch by
Venezuelan health professionals, the number of acutely malnourished children admitted to
hospitals is alarmingly high.52 Also, the FAO now places Venezuela behind only Yemen and Sudan
on its list of countries at high risk of facing a severe deterioration in food security.53
As the humanitarian crisis worsens, there is a growing risk of famine in Venezuela. As
noted, with more than 4 million Venezuelans having already fled to neighboring countries, and
millions more projected to flee by 2020, meeting the basic needs of migrants is one of the most
pressing issues receiving countries must address. The challenge includes providing access to
adequate nutrition for migrants who, in most cases, have experienced food insecurity or
malnutrition for some time as a result of severe food shortages in Venezuela. As such, the impact of
Venezuela’s food scarcity will potentially have lasting implications for several Latin American
countries.
According to the FAO, children living in a situation of moderate to severe food insecurity
are at elevated risk of suffering from stunting. Malnutrition suffered by migrant children will have
lasting impacts on their ability to fully grow and develop, placing an even greater burden on
receiving countries. The effects on the region will be devastating in terms of lost human capital,
and the additional costs of supporting children with disabilities. This phenomenon is also likely to
limit the positive economic contributions that Venezuelan migrants could make in host
communities.
A nutritional needs assessment conducted in March 2019 by health partners in Peru within
the framework of the Regional Inter-Agency Coordination Platform for Refugees and Migrants
from Venezuelan, reported that 3 percent of children under five years-old who entered Peru through
the binational centers for border health care services (Centros Binacionales de Atención en
Frontera––CEBAF) were acutely malnourished, 18 percent had chronic malnutrition, and 25
percent had anemia.54
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A Note on Xenophobia
As the number of Venezuelan migrants continues to rise, there has been a rise in xenophobia
against them among local populations in receiving countries, and a corresponding increase in
restrictive policies implemented by some countries in the region. While xenophobia is primarily
driven by a perception that migrants are a drain on local resources and are taking jobs away from
local workers, there is a growing narrative that migrants represent a security threat to receiving
countries.
In August 2018, Venezuelans in Brazil experienced violent attacks and arson crimes against
their houses. In November 2016, a public march protesting against the arrival of Venezuelan
migrants was organized in Panama, raising the alarm about growing xenophobia.55 More recently,
in 2019, as a result of a domestic-violence incident in which a Venezuelan man murdered his
Ecuadorean wife, locals in Ibarra, Ecuador attacked the houses of Venezuelan migrants and
refugees, accusing them of being criminals. There are also passive-aggressive manifestations of
this phenomenon, including discriminatory comments and other actions. Anecdotally, people have
put their properties up for rent, while discriminating against Venezuelans. Likewise, employers in
search of qualified workers often reject Venezuelan applicants with work permits. There are also
reports of discrimination and xenophobia by immigration officers. Anti-immigrant rhetoric exists
in other parts of Latin America as well. In the Dominican Republic, some hard-liners have
described the influx of Haitians, caused by economic disparities between the two countries as a
quiet invasion.56
The media also play a role in stirring up discriminatory sentiments. Across the region, local
media gave significant attention to isolated examples of individual crimes committed by
Venezuelans in host countries. Though isolated cases, such examples feed the misperception that
migrants represent a threat to citizen security. In April 2019, Peru’s interior minister announced
the deportation of more than forty Venezuelan migrants for concealing their criminal records or for
residing illegally in the country, citing the need to protect the Peruvian people against the threat
these migrants represented.57 However, while there are examples across the region of individual
Venezuelan migrants who committed crimes in the countries to which they fled, the available data
do not support fears about Venezuelan migrants representing a widespread threat to citizen
security.
In the case of Colombia, a Brookings report released in December 2018, found no evidence
that Venezuelan migrants contribute to rising crime in Colombia. Using annual crime statistics
collected by the National Colombian Police, it found Venezuelans committed only 0.4 percent of
all crimes in Colombia in 2018.58 The data also show that Venezuelans commit crimes at a much
lower rate than their population share would predict. The report also cites studies from Italy, the
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United Kingdom, and Malaysia, which found that crime rates fell sharply after immigrants
integrated into the workforce.59 Receiving countries must do more to make these statistics known,
to combat public misperceptions and to prevent the rise of xenophobia. Otherwise, more countries
in the region might respond to growing domestic anti-migrant sentiment by tightening their
migratory policies, further increasing the burden on those countries that are lowering the barriers to
entry for Venezuelan migrants and contributing to the vulnerability of these populations.
The level of generosity of communities that willingly take in migrants tends to decrease as
resources are strained, and as the influx of migrants affects the lives of local citizens, including their
schools, access to services, and job opportunities. In Colombia, for example, citizens showed
tremendous generosity—owing in no small part to the long history of Venezuelans taking in
Colombians fleeing violence during the prolonged armed conflict at home. As the volume of
Venezuelan migrants strained the system and migrants began sleeping in public spaces, many
Colombians began expressing hesitation. The posture of Colombians appears to be that they want
to be generous and help the migrants, but do not want to do so on their doorstep.

Political Effects of a Growing Diaspora in Receiving Countries and Venezuelan
Politics in the Future
Diaspora refers to “the movement, migration, or scattering of a people away from an established or
ancestral homeland.”60 Throughout history, diasporas have played a significant political role in
promoting democratic, economic, cultural, and human development in their receiving countries,
as well as in their countries of origin. This political importance is illustrated by the Jewish, Greek,
Armenian, Cuban, and other diasporas in the United States, and the Italian, Spanish, and
Portuguese diasporas in Latin America. With four million Venezuelan migrants scattered
throughout the world, and most of them settled in Latin America and the Caribbean, it is critical
to consider the political influence of this diaspora.
Politically, it has the potential to influence local, national, regional, and Venezuelan politics
in various ways, especially if members of the diaspora organize themselves. Indeed, “different
diaspora-based associations may lobby host countries (to shape policies in favor of a homeland or
to challenge a homeland government), influence their homelands (through their support or
opposition of governments), give financial and other support to political parties, social movements
and civil society organizations, or sponsor terrorism or the perpetration of violent conflict in the
homeland.”61
At the national and local levels, the presence of newcomers—who are settling with
temporary residence status, or remain and acquire a second nationality —will alter local and
national politics.62 Two crucial medium- to potential long-term impacts include the dynamics of
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political-party competition—specifically, the discourse during campaigns—as well as the
changing composition of the electorate as newcomers become nationals of the receiving countries
and gain the ability to vote (and to be elected). The Venezuelan migration crisis will undoubtedly
influence upcoming electoral campaigns in Colombia and Brazil. The migration crisis was highly
politicized in Colombia’s October 2019 local elections given the Duque administration’s active
engagement and generosity toward Venezuelan migrants who are taxing local resources. In
particular, the economic costs and security concerns associated with the migrant flows, as well as
the lack of a definite end to the protracted humanitarian crisis underway, are having a significant
impact on President Duque’s approval ratings and are posing additional challenges to a country
trying to achieve peace after a protracted armed conflict. In Chile, municipal elections will be held
again in 2020, and the migration issue will surely be prominent in the electoral campaigns, as it
will also be for the 2021 presidential elections.
It is also crucial to assess the apparent disconnect between the political views and demands
of Venezuelan leaders and influencers in the diaspora, which tend to be much more hardline, and
those of Venezuelans in their home country. This distinction is particularly notable when it comes
to discussions about possible options to resolve the ongoing crisis and restore democracy in
Venezuela the country, where Venezuelans in the diaspora seem to hold more extreme views. This
is also the case regarding politics in the receiving countries. For example, in February 2019, a
group of opposition Venezuelans who migrated to Chile denied and minimized the country’s
history with the disappeared during the Pinochet dictatorship.63 This caused outrage and public
hostility because of perceived lack of respect for the dictatorship’s victims by migrant
Venezuelans. Although there are important points of commonality regarding the need for a
democratic transition, the two groups are not always aligned in terms of the best way to bring
about that change, or about what other issues need to be part of the political discussion.
Peru might also hold a presidential election next year, as its president recently announced.
Municipal elections were held in November 2018, in which some candidates promoted xenophobic
and nationalistic views. One of the candidates for mayor of Lima spoke against Venezuelan
migrants and used xenophobic language to win votes and popularity, attacking a competing party
for facilitating Venezuelan migration.64
Venezuelans abroad can also be a source of political influence in their native Venezuela.
Some of the roles they can play include: being vocal about the current situation in Venezuela and
the suffering endured by Venezuelans in host communities; influencing policymakers in receiving
countries with regard to public policies that aim to restore the democratic order and promote free
and fair elections in Venezuela; and mobilizing humanitarian support, both inside Venezuela and
in receiving countries. Venezuelans in the diaspora have been organizing to provide support to
fellow nationals at home. The NGO Visión Democrática has documented more than one hundred
Venezuelan NGOs in the United States mobilizing to send humanitarian assistance to
Venezuelans.65 Finally, Venezuelans can take advantage of opportunities to peacefully and
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lawfully demonstrate on behalf of democracy and human rights in Venezuela.66
According to the Pew Research Center, nearly two hundred thousand Venezuelan
immigrants in the United States reside in Florida, a critically important electoral battleground state.
Nearly forty-five thousand reside in Texas.67 There is no up-to-date census count to denote the
number of Venezuelan immigrants who have been naturalized and, therefore, have the right to
vote. With no end in sight to the protracted crisis in Venezuela, many of these immigrants and their
children are likely to stay in the United States if given a chance to do so legally, making them a
potentially powerful political demographic in key battleground states in the future. Equally
important is their ability to influence their host communities, even before acquiring the right to
vote.
As Venezuela hopefully transitions out of a dictatorial regime via democratic elections
complying with international standards, a critical issue that will need to be addressed is the
electoral status of migrants. The 1999 Venezuela Constitution allows for nationals to vote abroad.
However, the Law on Electoral Processes (or LOPRE Law) includes a clause stipulating that “only
those voters abroad who have residency or any other regime that certifies regular status outside of
Venezuela will be able to vote.”68 Since about 60 percent of Venezuelans in the diaspora lack
regular status, this clause would exclude approximately 2.4 million people from being eligible to
vote. An additional aspect to consider is whether a new circumscription for Venezuelans abroad
can be established. Countries around the world— including several in Latin America—allow their
nationals not only to vote for president from abroad, but also to elect representatives to the national
legislature in a special circumscription. Doing so could help establish a more deliberate link
between Venezuela and Venezuelans abroad, allowing them to promote their agendas and to
influence the political process. Also, should some of the four million Venezuelan migrants residing
abroad decide to return home, specific policies would have to be developed.69 Such policies must
enable returning Venezuelans’ access to national identity documents, schools, health services, and
employment opportunities, as well as meet other socio-emotional needs faced by returning
migrants and refugees.70
One largely unexplored aspect of these Venezuelan migrant and refugee flows is assessing
who among them support Maduro, and what kind of impact their presence can have in the internal
politics of receiving countries. Indeed, some pro-Maduro migrants and refugees arrive with limited
material means, with no personal patrimony or jobs, dire economic conditions, and a need for
international protection. However, others arrive with resources, open businesses, buy homes and
properties in the receiving countries, and are engaging politically to destabilize the governments
that took a stand against the Maduro regime, while amassing support for Maduro, and influencing
campaigns and politics on the regime’s behalf.
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In response, countries in the region have taken measures to limit any potential destabilizing
actions by Venezuelan migrants. In January 2019, for example, Colombia prohibited the entry of
Nicolás Maduro and around two hundred people associated with his regime. In July, in response to
a report by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights—Chile announced that approximately
one hundred Venezuelans would be expelled.71 Similar discussions have occurred in Peru.
However, there is still no systematic policy to address the presence of pro-Maduro Venezuelans in
receiving countries. This demonstrates the need for countries that have recognized Juan Guaidó as
interim president to consider how to deal with and how to limit demonstrations of pro-Maduro
influence in local politics. The practice of limiting foreign contributions to electoral campaigns is
one example, but there may be a need to extend this to the regular financing of political parties,
candidates, and advocacy groups.
According to the Pew Research Center, more Venezuelans have applied for asylum in the
United States than nationals from any other country.72 However, the Transactional Records Access
Clearinghouse, a data research organization at Syracuse University, found that nearly half the
Venezuelan asylum applications that have come before immigration judges in the last five years
have been denied.73 By comparison, nearly 90 percent of claims from Haiti and Mexico are denied,
while less than 20 percent of claims from Syria and about 10 percent from Belarus are denied.
Recent data also suggests that Venezuelan nationals account for the highest overstay rate among
Hispanic non-immigrants admitted to the United States.
Although there are concentrations of Venezuelan migrants in Houston, Boston, and
Washington, DC, most of them — approximately two hundred thousand—have settled in South
Florida. Their presence influences how US foreign policy toward Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua
evolves. Similarly, it is expected that the political influence of the Venezuelan diaspora will also
be seen in elections not just in Florida, but nationally.
Receiving countries may take steps to assess their double-nationality laws and prepare for
the re-composition of their electorates given the continued flow of Venezuelan migrants. Equally
important, countries may seek to regulate hate-speech campaigning in elections and launch social
campaigns against xenophobia and discrimination. Countries may also need to develop policies to
deal with migrants who support Maduro and have the intention and capacity to negatively influence
local politics. Finally, further studies should address the electoral behavior of the Venezuelan
diaspora in receiving countries (including especially the United States and Colombia).
The first step to prepare for elections in Venezuela should be to eliminate the restriction in
the LOPRE law, rebuild the electoral registry abroad, and set up voting arrangements for the
millions of Venezuelans living abroad. Furthermore, a future Venezuelan government could also
consider creating a special circumscription for Venezuelans abroad, or a special ministry or
secretariat to attend to the needs of the diaspora while developing a policy for return migration.
Similarly, to attract the knowledge, experience, and capital of Venezuela’s growing diaspora,
Venezuela should consider passing legislation to promote incentives or bonds for expatriate
investment, customs or import incentives, property rights, and other measures.
Migración Colombia, online video, accessed July 7, 2019, https://www.pscp.tv/w/1DXGyaEZpaZGM; “Human Rights in the Bolivarian Republic
of Venezuela,” Human Rights Council, June 24–July 12, 2019,
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Conclusions
Neighboring countries have generously opened their arms to help those fleeing Venezuela in the
context of the ongoing humanitarian, economic and political crisis. However, as the flow of
migrants has increased, so too has the strain on local and national government resources and basic
services, highlighting the destabilizing effect a prolonged crisis could have on the region.
Understanding the key challenges facing host countries is the first step to ensuring that they, and
the region, are prepared to tackle them, and to take precautionary measures to maintain regional
stability. In this regard, several key conclusions stand out.
First, policy responses at every stage of the process matter greatly. Depending on the
effectiveness of national and regional policy responses, the region could either experience
increasing instability or reap benefits over the medium- to long-term from the largest displacement
of people in the history of the Western Hemisphere. Policy responses need to promote a "safe,
orderly, and regular" migration process.74 The most efficient way to take advantage of the flow of
more than four million Venezuelan migrants to date, and those expected to flee before the current
crisis is resolved, is to regularize their status and provide them with work permits. One immediate
measure host countries should consider is to conduct a census of Venezuelans living in their
territories, to help ensure that everyone has access to basic services—including health care,
education, and economic opportunities—while reducing the number of migrants living in the
shadows. This would not only ensure that migrants’ rights are protected, including against
exploitation, but will also encourage them to become active participants in the formal economy of
the host societies.
Second, countries across Latin America and the Caribbean, and the international
community, must deliver on commitments pledged, as well as international obligations to support
migrants and refugees. In various regional fora, including the OAS, the Lima Group, and the Quito
process, host countries have committed to ensuring that Venezuelan migrants and refugees’ rights
are protected. This requires flexibility in terms of entry requirements for Venezuelans, and the
consideration of more permanent, less restrictive migration regimes. It also requires that countries
put in place policies that focus on the integration of Venezuelan migrants into the formal labor
market. However, ambitious pledges are not enough. Receiving countries should be prepared to
deliver on those commitments, which will require significant and sustained support from the donor
and international community. In other words, additional efforts much be undertaken to close the
gap between commitments and deliverables in the international response to the migration crisis.
Third, in addition to scaling efforts to address the short-term humanitarian needs of
Venezuelan migrants and refugees, the international community should also focus on the middleand long-term needs of receiving countries and that of the Venezuelan migrants they are hosting.
The development needs of those countries that are bearing the largest share of the cost of accepting
and integrating the Venezuelan migrants are significant and will be long-lasting. The international
community has an important role to play in helping to ensure that this burden is shared, and not
borne primarily by upper-middle-income countries in the region whose capacity is severely
strained. The support of the international community is not just about solidarity. It is also critical to
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preventing the deterioration of regional stability and security.
Fourth, the international community should develop a coordinated response to the health risks
emanating from the migration crisis. The international community, and in particular countries in
the region, should coordinate efforts so that technical knowledge and resources can be shared in
addressing the epidemiological and health crisis facing Venezuela, as well as Venezuelan migrants,
and the countries who are receiving them.
Finally, South American countries with limited resources are unable to manage the growing
humanitarian crisis without the continued and expanded support of the international community.
This is a global crisis, not just a regional one. Therefore, there is a need to quantify the estimated
costs associated with the Venezuelan migration crisis–including those associated with short-term
humanitarian and longer-term development needs. Accordingly, the international community
should play a more substantial role in support of countries that are assuming the greatest share of
the cost of receiving, caring for, and integrating the largest flow of migrants the region has seen in
recent history. One compelling way to do so is by convening an International Solidarity Conference
to raise critically needed financial commitments on the part of international donors, multilateral
organizations, and the private sector.
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